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KING V. BURWELL AND THE VALIDITY OF FEDERAL TAX 
SUBSIDIES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Set for oral argument on March 4, 2015, King v. Burwell brings to the 
Supreme Court yet another challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
The King plaintiffs cite 26 U.S.C. § 36B to attack the validity of certain 
federal health insurance subsidies provided by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) through the ACA. Specifically, because § 36B authorizes subsidies for 
low-income taxpayers who purchase health insurance from an “Exchange 
established by the State,” the plaintiffs allege that such subsidies are not 
valid on exchanges operated by the federal government where the states 
refused to operate a state-sponsored exchange. Given that the federal 
government operates exchanges in thirty-four states, the Supreme Court’s 
ruling will potentially affect nearly ten million taxpayers nationwide. 
Professors Eric Segall and Jonathan Adler debate the merits of King v. 
Burwell, and each suggests how the Court should rule. Professor Segall 
argues that the Court should follow the IRS’s interpretation of § 36B—
namely, that federal tax subsidies are available in a state with a federally 
operated exchange, because the law allows the federal government to 
operate the “Exchange established by the State.” Professor Segall emphasizes 
that Chevron deference requires the Court to defer to the IRS interpreta-
tion. In response, Professor Adler contends that Chevron deference is 
unnecessary because the statutory language is clear: an “Exchange estab-
lished by the State” cannot be an exchange established by the Department 
of Health and Human Services. Professor Adler argues that, given the 
unambiguous language in the statute, the Court need not defer to the IRS 
interpretation and should rule for the plaintiffs.  
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Making Law Out of Nothing at All: Why the Government Should Win  
the Latest Obamacare Challenge 
 
 
ERIC J. SEGALL† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 is yet again in front of the United 
States Supreme Court. On March 4, 2015, in King v. Burwell, ideologically 
driven plaintiffs will once more ask the Justices to dismember President 
Obama’s signature legislative achievement.2 This time, the plaintiffs’ claim 
is that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has no legal authority to 
provide federal tax subsidies to low-income purchasers of health insurance 
on federal exchanges.3 If the challenge is successful, nearly ten million 
people may lose their health insurance.4 
Many issues, both constitutional and statutory, that reach the United 
States Supreme Court raise difficult and complex interpretive and normative 
questions. To name just a few, laws relating to abortion, affirmative action, 
and campaign finance regulation implicate competing fundamental values, 
and complicated regulatory cases often involve thorny definitional and 
linguistic problems. Reasonable people can and do disagree over such cases. 
 
† Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I would 
like to thank Nicholas Bagley, Erin Fuse Brown, Kenneth Jost, and Ken Kelly for helpful comments. 
1
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
2 See Brief for Petitioners at i, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 
7386999 (stating the question presented to the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell); Docket, No. 14-
114, King v. Burwell, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-
114.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PH5Q-SSJJ (setting oral argument 
for March 4, 2015). 
3 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at i (“The question presented is whether the Internal Reve-
nue Service . . . may permissibly promulgate regulations to extend tax-credit subsidies to coverage 
purchased through Exchanges established by the . . . ACA.”). 
4 Joan McCarter, Study: 9.6 Million People Would Lose Insurance if the U.S. Supreme Court Guts 
Obamacare, DAILY KOS ( Jan. 8, 2015, 1:42 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/01/08/1356441/-
Study-9-6-million-people-would-lose-insurance-if-the-U-S-Supreme-nbsp-Court-guts-nbsp-Obamacare, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AJ3A-RJC9. 
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The King case, however, is different. If well-established legal rules matter 
to the Justices, the plaintiffs will lose—at least partly because, under 
accepted principles of statutory interpretation, if reasonable people can 
disagree about the meaning of the ACA, the plaintiffs have to lose. The real 
suspense is whether the Supreme Court’s decision will be grounded in law 
or politics. If history is any guide, the ACA may be in trouble. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ACA AND PREVIOUS CHALLENGES 
From the moment the ACA was first introduced in Congress, the entire 
legislation relied on three fundamental and interlocking ideas. First, the law 
would not allow insurance companies to deny consumers coverage based on 
preexisting medical conditions or charge consumers more for those conditions. 
Second, because consumers would no longer be penalized for waiting until 
they became ill to purchase health insurance—and many rational consumers 
would do exactly that—the government would require consumers to buy 
insurance or to instead pay a penalty or tax. And third, because millions of 
Americans would not be able to afford the premiums the law would obligate 
them to pay, the federal government would provide subsidies to those 
consumers with low incomes. All three of these elements (commonly 
referred to as the “three-legged stool”) were viewed as necessary for the law 
to succeed.5 
As soon as the bill passed both houses of Congress (in an admittedly 
unusual procedure),6 highly motivated conservative and libertarian law 
professors and other right-wing advocacy groups began fighting it with 
every imaginable legal tool. They first challenged the part of the law 
requiring people to purchase insurance or to instead pay a penalty or tax.7 
The academics knew that if the mandate was stricken from the law—if one 
leg of the stool was cut off—the rest of the ACA would likely go as well. 
 
5 See generally Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially 
Repealing the Affordable Care Act, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/report/2010/08/05/8226/health-care-reform-is-a-three-legged-
stool, archived at http://perma.cc/8LBS-3HHH. 
6 See James C. Capretta, The Reconciliation Option, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 18, 2011, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/node/280274/print, archived at http://perma.cc/ZA4D-9Q7T 
(discussing how a congressional budgetary procedure, “reconciliation,” was instrumental to the 
ACA’s passage). 
7 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (“On the day the 
President signed the Act into law, . . . [t]he plaintiffs alleged . . . that the individual mandate 
provisions of the Act exceeded Congress’s powers . . . .”). 
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The first lawsuit attempting to gut the ACA was filed just “minutes after 
the President signed” the bill into law.8 
The main architect of the anti-ACA legal strategy was Professor Randy 
Barnett of Georgetown, who, along with other contributors to the legal blog 
The Volokh Conspiracy (including Professor Jonathan Adler of Case Western), 
made the curious argument that a law comprehensively regulating a trillion 
dollar industry that affects every single state was somehow not a regulation 
of “Commerce . . . among the several States.”9 They isolated the ACA’s 
individual mandate from the rest of the legislative scheme and argued that, 
if the mandate was valid, pretty soon the government could force people to 
buy broccoli.10 
These professors and other scholars wrote legal blogs and op-eds in ma-
jor newspapers, assisted with briefs, and used every social media resource at 
their disposal to make an extremely weak legal argument (that the sky was 
falling) look respectable.11 As conservative Harvard Law School professor 
and former Reagan Administration official Charles Fried noted at the time, 
the arguments “don’t make much sense but the music is there.”12 
The strategy of changing the public dialogue from law to politics almost 
worked. Five Supreme Court Justices held that Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power does not extend to mandates13—even though not a single 
word in the Constitution prohibits mandates, and several mandates were 
 
8 Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 
(N.D. Fla. 2011), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Josh Blackman, How Randy Barnett Joined the 
Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 10, 2013, 10:29 AM), 
http://volokh.com/2013/09/10/randy-barnett-joined-constitutional-challenge-obamacare, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4H2U-33NM (noting Professor Barnett and Professor Adler’s contributions to the 
Obamacare discourse); see also Randy E. Barnett, Is Health-Care Reform Constitutional?, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/19/AR2010
031901470.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6DXT-6XL3 (discussing Professor Barnett’s 
Commerce Clause theory). 
10 See Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popu-
lar Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 69 (2013) (explaining the 
“broccoli hypothetical” and its impact). 
11 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. 
12 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Vindication for Challenger of Health Care Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/randy-barnetts-pet-cause-end-of-
health-law-hits-supreme-court.html?_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/86FB-AURV. 
13 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587. 
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employed by the very first Congresses (so much for conservative reliance on 
text and history).14 
But, as we know, Justice Roberts decided to join the four moderates on the 
Court and uphold the mandate—not as an exercise of the Commerce Clause 
power but rather as a legitimate tax.15 The ACA, and its three-legged stool, 
lived for another day (though the Court struck down a significant aspect of 
the law’s Medicaid expansion). 
Numerous other cases were filed challenging the ACA on a variety of 
other grounds16 but, with the exception of the Hobby Lobby decision,17 they 
were unsuccessful. Now, however, led by Professor Adler, right-wing 
pundit Michael Cannon, and a host of conservative think tanks such as the 
Cato Institute, the ACA is yet again before the United States Supreme Court. 
II. KING V. BURWELL 
This time the case is not a constitutional challenge but rather a statutory 
argument that the IRS has misinterpreted the law. In King v. Burwell, the 
plaintiffs claim that the third leg of the stool, federal subsidies for those 
who are legally required to buy health insurance but who cannot afford the 
premiums, cannot be made available in the thirty-four states that refused to 
create their own insurance exchanges and in which the federal government 
runs the exchange.18 If the Court rules for the plaintiffs, it is likely that the 
health care markets in those states will be plunged into chaos and the ACA 
crippled (unless Congress were to step in and amend the law—a highly 
unlikely event).19 
One does not have to be a health care expert or legal academic to fully 
understand the plaintiffs’ argument and see why it has no legal merit. The 
King plaintiffs are challenging the IRS’s decision to provide subsidies on all 
health care exchanges regardless of whether those exchanges are operated by 
 
14 See generally Einer Elhauge, If Health Insurance Mandates Are Unconstitutional, Why Did the 
Founding Fathers Back Them?, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/politics/102620/individual-mandate-history-affordable-care-act, archived at http://perma.cc/
AS5W-7N25 (discussing mandates passed by the first Congresses). 
15 See generally Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS 
( July 2, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-
care-law, archived at http://perma.cc/2VQH-R8EH. 
16 See The Cases, HEALTH CARE LAWSUITS, http://healthcarelawsuits.org/cases.php (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B2NU-SFU5 (collecting relevant cases). 
17 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (striking down regu-
lations requiring contraception coverage under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
18 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 1-3 (“[T]he Act only subsidizes coverage through 
an Exchange established by a state.”). 
19 See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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the state or federal governments.20 When a plaintiff challenges an agency 
decision as being inconsistent with an act of Congress, the legal rules are 
well established. Under the landmark Chevron case, a court must first 
determine whether Congress spoke unambiguously on the issue.21 If Congress 
has done so, and the agency decision is inconsistent with that clear lan-
guage, the court will strike down the decision.22 If the law is ambiguous or 
unclear, however, the agency’s decision must be upheld if it is reasonable—a 
low threshold.23 It is well-settled law that the court must look at the statute 
as a whole, not individual provisions taken out of context, to make those 
determinations.24 
In other words, for the plaintiffs to prevail, assuming that law matters, they 
must demonstrate that the ACA as a whole clearly and unambiguously pre-
cludes the IRS from providing tax credits to people who buy health insurance 
from federal exchanges. The plaintiffs simply cannot make that showing. 
The plaintiffs rely on an ACA section stating that subsidies will be 
available for certain low-income taxpayers who purchase health insurance 
from an “Exchange established by the State.”25 They then argue that exchanges 
created by the federal government are not “established by the State,” and 
therefore the IRS acted illegally by deciding to provide subsidies on federal 
exchanges.26 These health exchanges are not physical places but rather 
websites offering health insurance in compliance with ACA requirements. 
The problem with the plaintiffs’ argument is that it ignores another sec-
tion of the ACA, which states that, if the states do not create a health 
exchange as required by the first section, the federal government will 
establish “such exchange.”27 The authority given to the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) is not to create “an” exchange, a 
 
20 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 5-7. 
21 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); see also 
Chevron Doctrine, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2624 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/EF4K-NH2D (“[T]he court must 
determine whether Congress spoke directly to the question at issue. If so, then the court defers to 
the statute.”). 
22 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9. 
23 Id. at 843-44. 
24 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (“In 
determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court 
should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”). 
25 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a), (b)(2)(A) (2012); see Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 3. 
26 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 11, 17. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
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“federal” exchange, or a “United States” exchange but quite specifically 
“such” exchange. 
What does the word “such” connote in the context of the law? Given 
that the entire structure of the ACA relies on three essential components—
one of which is the availability of federal subsidies—it is no surprise that 
the IRS read the statute to allow for subsidies on both state and federal 
exchanges. The only legal issue is whether the clear language of the entire 
law makes that reading impermissible because it is an unreasonable 
interpretation of the statutory scheme. 
A good way to think about that question is through the following 
hypothetical. Imagine the federal government wanted to encourage people 
to save more money for retirement and hoped states would cooperate. And 
imagine Congress then passed a law that read: 
Every state shall set up an investment exchange to encourage long term 
saving. Any taxpayer who invests in an exchange established by the state shall 
receive a $1000 federal tax credit. If a state does not create an investment 
exchange, the Secretary of the Treasury shall create such exchange. 
Looking at this language, and knowing the purpose of the law, could the 
Secretary of the Treasury provide for tax credits in the federal investment 
exchanges? The answer is obviously yes—that would be a reasonable 
interpretation of the law (and the best interpretation of the law). The word 
“such” according to Black’s Law Dictionary means something “having just 
been mentioned.”28 This clear parsing of the relevant statutory language 
shows that the government should win (in both the hypothetical and the 
real case). Everything else about the King case is doublespeak and lawyer talk. 
For example, like the plaintiffs and numerous other amici, Professor 
Adler and Mr. Cannon argue in their amicus brief that Congress used the 
“established by a state” language to warn states that, if states did not create 
their own exchange, their citizens would not be entitled to federal subsidies.29 
This narrative is pure fiction. No language in the law employs this carrot-
and-stick approach, and no state was warned at any time by any member of 
Congress or the Obama Administration that it would lose the subsidies if it 
did not create its own exchange. Today, there is such overwhelming evidence 
 
28 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1661 (10th ed. 2014); see also Brief for the Respondents at 22, 
King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2015), 2015 WL 349885 (also citing the definition from 
Black’s Law Dictionary). 
29 Brief of Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 4-5, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2014), 2014 WL 7463548. 
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that this story is untrue that it would be surprising if either the plaintiffs, 
Professor Adler, or Mr. Cannon continue to rely on it.30 
Moreover, even if some governmental person, someplace, somewhere, 
actually thought that the ACA conditioned subsidies on states creating their 
own exchanges, such a veiled threat would not pass constitutional muster. 
Under the Supreme Court’s spending power doctrine, conditions on federal 
grant money must be expressed unambiguously so that states understand 
what they must do and what they will lose should they choose not to accept 
the condition.31 It is not plausible that the Congress that passed the ACA 
would have bet its entire success on such an invisible and legally dubious threat. 
Professor Adler and Mr. Cannon’s amicus brief also argues that Congress 
included in amendments to the ACA a provision directing the IRS to treat 
exchanges established by U.S. territories as if they had been established by 
states, thus creating “equivalence between territories and ‘States.’”32 It then 
argues that, since Congress made no similar statement about federal exchanges, 
subsidies were limited to state exchanges.33 
This argument completely misses the point that, when HHS was given 
authority to create “such” exchange as the one “established by the State,” 
the subsidies would follow the federally created exchange, so no reason 
existed for another amendment. The territories, conversely, were not given 
the power to create “such” an exchange as the states in the original law.34 
Finally, as health law expert Nicholas Bagley has argued, if the law is 
read as the plaintiffs, Professor Adler, and Mr. Cannon argue, federal 
exchanges would not be able to provide insurance to anyone.35 The ACA 
says that only people who “reside[] in the State that established the 
 
30 See Greg Sargent, Republican State Officials Cast Doubts on Anti-Obamacare Lawsuit, WASH. 
POST ( Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/01/27/republican-state-
officials-cast-doubts-on-anti-obamacare-lawsuit, archived at http://perma.cc/TX27-TRLG (“Several 
state officials who were directly involved at the highest levels in early deliberations over setting up 
state exchanges—all of them Republicans or appointees of GOP governors—have [said] that at no 
point in the decision-making process during the key time-frame was the possible loss of subsidies 
even considered as a factor.”). 
31 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
32 Brief of Adler and Cannon, supra note 29, at 12-13. 
33 Id. 
34 See generally id. 
35 Nicholas Bagley, Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act, 40 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3), available at http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/
content/ early / 2014 / 11 / 21 / 03616878 - 2867881. full. pdf + html? utm _ source = blog & utm _ medium = blog % 20
post&utm_campaign=j-JHP_PAP_Dec14 (“If Adler and Cannon were correct that Congress 
scrupulously distinguished between state-established exchanges and exchanges in general, then no 
one in a state with a federally established exchange could go on that exchange to buy a health plan.”). 
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Exchange” may purchase insurance from the exchanges.36 If Congress really 
meant to distinguish between state-established exchanges and federal 
exchanges, the law would seem to preclude people residing in a state with a 
federally established exchange from purchasing insurance from that 
exchange.37 Congress could not possibly have intended for HHS to create 
federal exchanges incapable of selling health insurance.  
The gist of this case is whether the power of the federal government to 
create “such” an exchange as the one “established by the State,” also gives 
the IRS the power to provide subsidies on that exchange, just like it provides 
on the exchanges run by the states. Looking at the law as whole, and the 
context in which it was passed, shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that 
the answer is yes. And even if that interpretation is only “reasonable,” the 
Chevron doctrine requires that the government prevail.38 
CONCLUSION 
Under the ACA, all three legs of the stool were intended to be the basis 
of health insurance in every state, regardless of whether the states or the 
federal government actually operate “such” exchange. Any other ruling by 
the Supreme Court would ignore clear text and unassailable context, and 
would make law out of nothing at all. 
  
 
36 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f )(1)(a)(ii) (2012). 
37 See generally Bagley, supra note 35. 
38 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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REBUTTAL 
Text, Context, and Tax Credits 
 
 
JONATHAN H. ADLER† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has returned to the Supreme Court for 
the third time in four years. Having considered a frontal challenge to the 
statute as a whole, as well as the tension between the ACA’s coverage 
requirements and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Court must 
now dig into the bowels of the ACA’s text.  
In King v. Burwell, the Justices are being asked to decide whether the 
ACA allows the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to offer tax credits for the 
purchase of health insurance in exchanges established by the federal 
government.39 Although the practical and political ramifications of the case 
may be significant, King presents the sort of interpretive question courts 
face all the time. Were it not for the context, King would be a run-of-the-mill 
case of statutory interpretation, rather than the battle royal over the future 
of the ACA it has become. Be that as it may, traditional approaches to 
statutory interpretation are sufficient to resolve the case and amply support 
the petitioners’ claims. 
I. EXCHANGES UNDER THE ACA 
A central feature of the ACA is the creation of health insurance exchanges 
for the purchase of health insurance in the individual market. Each exchange 
is supposed to be a marketplace in which consumers in the individual 
market can compare and purchase qualifying health insurance plans.40 The 
exchanges also serve as a means for the government to impose and enforce 
 
† Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and 
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
39 Brief for Petitioners at i, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 7386999. 
40 See Sandy Praeger, A View from the Insurance Commissioner on Health Care Reform, 20 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 186, 190 (2011) (“The main purpose of the exchanges will be to facilitate the 
comparison and purchase of coverage by individuals and small businesses.”). 
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relevant regulatory requirements, as well as to disburse tax credits and 
cost-sharing subsidies for qualifying health plan purchases.41 
Section 1311 of the ACA provides that every state “shall . . . establish” its 
own health insurance exchange.42 This requirement is unenforceable,43 
however, so the ACA provides states with numerous incentives to cooperate, as 
well as a federal fallback. Among other things, the ACA authorizes generous 
funding to help states set up their own exchanges.44 As for the fallback 
option, section 1321 of the ACA requires the federal government to “estab-
lish and operate” exchanges in states that fail to create exchanges or to enact 
other required reforms.45 
State exchanges are not only places to purchase qualifying health insur-
ance; they are also the statutory mechanism for delivering tax credits and 
cost-sharing subsidies to eligible individuals. Section 1401 of the ACA 
authorizes tax credits for qualifying health insurance plan purchases in “an 
Exchange established by the State under [section] 1311.”46 The King plaintiffs 
argue that this provision means what it says: tax credits are authorized only 
in exchanges established by the states under section 1311 of the ACA.47 That 
is, just as section 1401 authorizes tax credits for insurance only if it is 
purchased on “an Exchange,” it also authorizes tax credits for insurance only 
if it is purchased on an exchange that both complies with section 1311’s 
requirements and is “established by the State.”48 
Professor Segall contests this interpretation and argues that the repeated 
references to “established by the State” do not preclude tax credits issued 
through exchanges “established” by the Department of Health and Human 
 
41 Id.; see also Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The 
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 129-32 (2013) 
(describing the exchanges). 
42 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 
173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012)). 
43 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may not 
compel the states to implement by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”); 
see also Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“A state is not literally required to 
establish an Exchange; the ACA merely encourages it to do so.”). 
44 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(a), 124 Stat. 119, 
173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a) (2012)) (granting Treasury funds to the states to assist 
with the exchanges’ establishment). 
45 Id. § 1321(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012)). 
46 Id. sec. 1401, § 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 213, 216 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)). Section 1402 further authorizes payment of “cost-sharing” 
subsidies to insurance companies for qualifying health insurance plan purchases on exchanges 
where tax credits are available. Id. § 1402, 124 Stat. at 220-24 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18071 (2012)). 
47 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 39, at 3. 
48 For a more extensive version of this argument, see Adler & Cannon, supra note 41. 
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Services (HHS) under section 1321. This is so, he argues, because federal 
exchanges established by HHS are the full and complete equivalent of 
exchanges established by states under section 1311. In Professor Segall’s 
telling, it all comes down to a single word: “such.” Yet this single word 
cannot bear the weight Professor Segall places upon it. 
Section 1321 provides that should a state fail to create the “required 
exchange”—that is, the exchange required under section 1311—“the Secretary 
shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the State and the 
Secretary shall take such actions as are necessary to implement such other 
requirements.”49 But this language does not establish the proposition that 
an exchange established by HHS is an exchange “established by the State.” 
Section 1321 expressly refers to HHS as the entity that must “establish” the 
exchange and provides that HHS does so “within” the state, rather than on 
the state’s behalf. And were there any doubt that HHS is not a “State” 
under the ACA, section 1304 expressly provides that “‘State’ means each of 
the 50 States and the District of Columbia.”50 
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized in Halbig 
v. Burwell,51 section 1401 identifies three separate requirements that a 
qualifying health insurance plan purchase must meet for tax credits to be 
received: First, the purchase must take place on an exchange.52 Even though 
allowing tax credits for health insurance purchases regardless of place of 
purchase might advance the goal of expanding insurance coverage, the ACA 
authorizes tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies only for plans purchased in 
an exchange. Second, the exchange must have been established under 
section 1311.53 That is, the exchange must comply with the various require-
ments contained in section 1311 and other relevant provisions (such as 
sections 1312 and 1313). Third, and most significantly, the exchange must 
have been “established by the State.”54 That is, the availability of tax credits 
turns on both the type of exchange in which the insurance is purchased, as 
well as who established it. 
 
49 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012)). 
50 Id. § 1304(d), 124 Stat. at 172 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012)). 
51 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
52 See id. at 399. 
53 See id. at 399-400 (“[T]he Secretary is to establish the type of exchange described in section 
1311, [and] when she does so, she acts under section 1311, even though her authority appears in 
section 1321.”). 
54 Id. at 400 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)). 
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Accepting that “such exchange” is an exchange established under section 
1311 that fulfills section 1311’s requirements, HHS-established exchanges still 
only satisfy the first two requirements of an exchange eligible for federal tax 
subsidies, but do not satisfy the third.55 A section 1311 exchange established 
by the federal government is still not an exchange “established by the 
State.” In Professor Segall’s view, this additional language, added at 
multiple times and to multiple places in section 1401, serves no purpose at 
all. It is mere surplusage. Yet it is well established that courts are to make 
every effort to “give effect to every word that Congress used in the statute.”56 
Moreover, reading section 1321 to create complete equivalence between 
exchanges established under section 1311 and those established under section 
1321 (without regard for whether they are established by a state or by HHS) 
does more than generate surplusage. It also creates other problems for the 
statutory text. Numerous references to exchanges “established by the State” 
throughout the statute become incongruous if this phrase is read to include 
exchanges established by the federal government.57 For example, under 
Professor Segall’s interpretation, noncooperating states could constrain the 
operations of federally established exchanges.58 Thus, the ACA puts states’ 
Medicaid funds at risk if their exchanges fail to comply with various 
statutory requirements.59 But Professor Segall’s reading of the ACA would 
mean that states would have to monitor the federal government’s actions 
when it establishes exchanges for the states, lest they lose their Medicaid 
funds. Although Professor Segall purports to care about the whole text, he 
ignores these and other provisions that cut against his interpretation of 
the statute. 
Professor Segall claims that, were the Court to accept the plaintiffs’ 
interpretation of the ACA, “federal exchanges would not be able to provide 
 
55 See id. (“The problem confronting the IRS Rule is that subsidies also turn on a third attribute 
of Exchanges: who established them.”). 
56 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207-08 n.53 (1985); see also Ernst Freund, Interpretation 
of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 218 (1917) (“[T]he legislator is presumed to, as in fact he does, 
choose his words deliberately intending that every word shall have a binding effect.”). 
57 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Test to Textualism in King v. Burwell: A Reply to Abbe Gluck, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/11/12/the-test-to-textualism-in-king-v-burwell-a-reply-to-abbe-gluck, archived at http://perma.cc/
Z8KV-2L6J (discussing ACA sections 1311(f ), 2001, and 2201 as examples). 
58 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(f )(3)(A), 
124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f )(3)(A) (2012)) (giving states control over 
whether to give exchanges “established by the State” authority to contract with “eligible entit[ies]” 
to carry out exchange responsibilities). 
59 See id. sec. 2201, § 1943(a), (b)(1)(D), 124 Stat. at 289, 290 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(a), 
(b)(1)(D) (2012)) (conditioning federal financial assistance on meeting statutory requirements, 
such as providing a “secure electronic interface” in the exchange “established by the State”). 
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insurance to anyone” because section 1312 provides that “qualified individuals” 
must be residents of “the State that established the Exchange.”60 Yet the 
relevant statutory provision, when read in context, creates no such absurd 
result and is readily harmonized with the rest of the statutory text. Section 
1312’s definition of a “qualified individual” who may “enroll in any qualified 
health plan available to such individual”61 is—like the other requirements of 
Part II of Subtitle D (sections 1311 through 1313)62—addressed to the states 
on the assumption that they have complied with section 1311’s command 
that each state establish its own exchange. This requirement is conditioned 
on the state’s cooperation. Should a state fail to cooperate, however, the 
residency requirement has no effect, as there is no state-established exchange 
to which it may apply. 
By contrast, when section 1321 requires HHS to establish an exchange, it 
also instructs HHS to “take such actions as are necessary to implement such 
other requirements” of the required exchange.63 This directive authorizes 
HHS to adopt parallel qualified-individual requirements for the federally 
established exchange. And even were this not the case, an incongruity or 
ambiguity created by different language in a different provision of the 
statute would not be enough to overcome the plain language of section 1401. 
II. DESPERATELY SEEKING AMBIGUITY 
Recognizing the difficulty of establishing that the ACA expressly authorizes 
tax credits in exchanges established by the federal government, Professor 
Segall seeks refuge in the Chevron doctrine, under which courts are to defer 
to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory text.64 The 
problem for Professor Segall’s argument, however, is that there is nothing 
ambiguous about the relevant statutory text. Thus there is no basis for 
deferring to the IRS’s interpretation. 
According to Professor Segall, the only relevant question is whether the 
agency has put forward a “reasonable” interpretation of a complex regulatory 
statute. Further, Professor Segall maintains, the mere existence of disa-
greement about the meaning of statutory text itself demonstrates that the 
agency position should—indeed, must—prevail. “If reasonable people can 
disagree,” he proclaims, “the plaintiffs have to lose.” Whatever the merits of 
 
60 Id. § 1312(f )(1)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. at 184 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f )(1)(A)(ii) (2012)). 
61 Id. § 1312(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 182 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(a)(1) (2012)). 
62 Id. §§ 1311–1313, 124 Stat. at 173-85 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031–18033 (2012)). 
63 Id. § 1321(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012)). 
64 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
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this approach to judicial review of agency action, it has little basis in the 
actual practice of federal courts. Indeed, were the law as Professor Segall 
describes, federal agencies would almost never lose Chevron cases at step 
one,65 except when unanimous agreement exists indicating that the agencies’ 
interpretations were unreasonable. 
Contrary to Professor Segall’s characterization of prevailing doctrine, 
the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts routinely reject potentially 
reasonable agency interpretations of complex statutes on the grounds that 
the text is sufficiently clear to resolve at Chevron step one, even if “reasonable 
people” can and do disagree. Multiple cases decided within the last year, 
including Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency,66 
demonstrate the point. In Utility Air Regulatory Group, “reasonable people”—
including four justices67—found the agency position to be “reasonable,” and 
yet the agency still lost. The law as applied by the courts is not as Professor 
Segall describes it. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that agencies can neither create nor 
resolve ambiguity by rewriting clear statutory terms or ignoring inconvenient 
statutory text.68 Nor have courts deemed statutory complexity sufficient to 
render a statute ambiguous. Instead, courts routinely work their way 
through thickets of statutory text to determine for themselves whether 
Congress directly addressed the issue at hand. If, under Chevron, Congress 
has addressed “the precise question at issue,”69 and the law is clear, that 
ends the matter, even if “reasonable” people might differ. 
 
65 Chevron outlined a two-step inquiry for courts to undertake when evaluating an agency’s 
interpretation of a federal statute. First, the court is to consider the relevant statutory text in order 
to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842. If so, the court is required to give effect to the unambiguous meaning of the text. If 
the court determines that the relevant text is “ambiguous,” however, and concludes that interpretive 
authority has been delegated to the agency in question, the court must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation, provided that such interpretation “is based upon a permissible construction of the 
statute.” Id. at 843. 
66 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014) (rejecting the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation 
of its authority to regulate stationary source greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act). 
67 Id. at 2449-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (along with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
disagreeing with the majority opinion). 
68 See, e.g., id. at 2446 (“The power of executing laws . . . does not include a power to revise 
clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice.”); id. (reaffirming “the core administra-
tive-law principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how 
the statute should operate”). 
69 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
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III. COULD CONGRESS HAVE MEANT IT? 
In Professor Segall’s telling, it was always Congress’s intent to “provide 
subsidies to those with low incomes” to help them purchase health insur-
ance. Perhaps so, but that does not mean Congress provided for such 
assistance in any and all circumstances. Instead, the law repeatedly condi-
tions benefits for needy populations on state cooperation with congressional 
design. The Medicaid expansion, for example, was always contingent upon 
state cooperation. Indeed, the federal government’s entire argument that 
the Medicaid expansion was constitutional was premised on the fact that 
states retained the choice to reject the expansion—a difficult and unpleasant 
choice, to be sure, but a choice nonetheless.70 As the ACA was written, 
Congress was even willing to risk benefits for preexisting Medicaid benefi-
ciaries to ensure state cooperation. When the Supreme Court held that 
conditioning preexisting Medicaid funds on acceptance of the Medicaid 
expansion was unconstitutionally coercive in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius,71 all the Court’s decision did was alter the calculus for 
resistant states. The states’ ability to choose—and to frustrate the law’s 
purposes—was always there. 
Eligibility for tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies is contingent upon 
income as well. Those who earn too much, or too little, are ineligible for tax 
credits.72 That is, as the ACA is written, individuals can be too poor to get 
help buying insurance. It may have been the ACA authors’ hope that such 
individuals would be covered by the Medicaid expansion, but (as noted 
above) that hope could only be fulfilled if states agreed to cooperate. 
It is also indisputable that those who drafted the ACA considered condi-
tioning subsidies for health insurance purchases on state cooperation. As 
Michael Cannon and I have detailed elsewhere, this idea was proposed by 
prominent health law experts and contained in draft legislation that led to 
 
70 See Brief for Respondents (Medicaid) at 34, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400) (“[T]he size of a federal grant may make it less likely, as a practical 
matter, that a State will view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests to warrant 
turning down the federal funds. But that doesn’t mean that the federal government, simply by 
offering, has coerced the State into accepting.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
71 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-05 (2012). 
72 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1401, § 36B(c)(1)(A), 
124 Stat. 119, 215 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2012)) (defining “applicable 
taxpayer” for purposes of the federal tax credit as “a taxpayer whose household income . . . exceeds 
100 percent but does not exceed 400 percent of an amount equal to the poverty line” (emphasis added)). 
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the ACA.73 The bill produced by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions (HELP) Committee, for instance, withheld subsidies from states 
that refused to adopt desired reforms.74 States that refused to create their 
own health insurance exchanges would be without subsidies for up to four 
years,75 and states that refused to enact the bill’s required employer mandate 
could forfeit such subsidies permanently.76 In fact, there is a long history of 
considering similar conditions in health care reform proposals.77 
Despite this history, Professor Segall insists that the ACA must provide 
for “all three legs of the stool” at all times. Here again he ignores facts that 
fail to fit his narrative. In reforming the child-only market, for example, the 
ACA imposed community-rating regulatory requirements, which beginning 
in September 2010 prevent insurance companies from charging people more 
for preexisting conditions, without providing subsidies or imposing an 
individual mandate.78 Congress similarly failed to provide a three-legged 
stool for U.S. territories79 or for the long-term care entitlement known as 
the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, 
even though the federal government’s chief actuary warned that the latter 
would implode unless the law also addressed possible adverse selection from 
too many high-risk individuals participating in the program.80 Professor 
Segall’s claim that the ACA consistently provides for all three legs of the 
proverbial stool is simply false. 
 
73 See Adler & Cannon, supra note 41, at 154-57 (discussing antecedent bills); see also Brief of 
Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22-28, 
King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2014), 2014 WL 7463548 (same). 
74 Adler & Cannon, supra note 41, at 155. 
75 See Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 3104(d)(1) (2009) (providing a 
federal fallback option only after “the expiration of the 4-year period following the date of enactment”). 
76 Id. § 3104(d)(2) (“With respect to a State that makes the election [refusing to enact the 
employer mandate], the residents of such State shall not be eligible for credits . . . until such State 
becomes a participating State . . . .”). 
77 See Chris Conover, Do Obamacare’s Challengers Have a ‘Nutty,’ ‘Stupid’ or ‘Screwy’ Interpretation 
of the Law?, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2015/
02/18/do-obamacares-challengers-have-a-nutty-stupid-or-screwy-interpretation-of-the-law, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CB9L-WX4H (discussing prior health care reform efforts). 
78 Adler & Cannon, supra note 41, at 174. 
79 See Sarah Kliff, Think Your State Has Obamacare Problems? They’re Nothing Compared to 
Guam., WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
12/19/think-your-state-has-obamacare-problems-theyre-nothing-compared-to-guam, archived at http://
perma.cc/HSU6-8FH4 (“While the Affordable Care Act requires health insurers in the territories 
to accept all shoppers no matter how sick, it does not mandate that all territorial residents buy 
plans nor does it provide subsidies to make coverage more affordable . . . .”). 
80 Adler & Cannon, supra note 41, at 174. 
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CONCLUSION: LAW OR POLITICS? 
Professor Eric Segall proclaims that King is an easy case. He maintains 
the plaintiffs’ arguments have “no legal merit” and that “politics” provides 
the only basis upon which the plaintiffs could prevail. Courts have not seen 
it this way. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit concluded the IRS rule at issue contravened the relevant statutory 
text, as did a district court in Oklahoma.81 Even the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, in ruling for the government, recognized the force of 
the plaintiff ’s arguments challenging the IRS rule, conceding that “a literal 
reading of the statute undoubtedly accords more closely with [the plaintiffs’] 
position.”82 In Professor Segall’s telling, these judges must all have been 
knaves or fools. 
Professor Segall’s insistence that those with whom he disagrees are playing 
politics while he seeks to uphold the law is even more curious given how 
much time and effort he expends trying to discredit the King case by casting 
aspersions on the motivations of the plaintiffs and their supporters. Contrary 
to what Professor Segall claims, I have never suggested (let alone argued) 
that “a law comprehensively regulating a trillion dollar industry that affects 
every single state was somehow not a regulation of ‘Commerce . . . among 
the several States.’” The article by Professor Randy Barnett that Professor 
Segall cites for this proposition does not make this argument either,83 nor is 
this what the Supreme Court held in its 2012 ACA decision.84 His charac-
terization of the arguments in King, and the strength of the plaintiffs’ case, 
is not much better. 
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 online/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-215.pdf. 
 
81 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 399, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 
No. 11-0030, 2014 WL 4854543, at *9 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014). 
82 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 369 (4th Cir. 2014). 
83 The article Professor Segall cites for this claim not only fails to support his argument, but 
asserts the opposite. See Randy E. Barnett, Is Health Care Reform Constitutional?, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/19/AR2010031901470.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/6DXT-6XL3 (distinguishing the regulation of health insurance 
from a mandate to engage in economic activity). 
84 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587-91 (2012) (limiting the 
Court’s Commerce Clause holding to the individual mandate of the ACA). 
